FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: INTEREST
DEDUCTION DISALLOWED BROKERAGE
HOUSE UNDER SECTION 265(2) WHEN LOANS
BEAR A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE
CARRYING OF TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES
In Leslie v. Commissionerl the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit held that a portion of a stock broker's interest
expense arising from a single revolving loan account which was
used to purchase both taxable and tax-exempt securities was
allocable to the purchase and holding of tax-exempt securities and fell
within the non-deductibility provisions of section 265(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Taxpayer was a partner in Bache
& Co., which in the course of its business purchased and held a
small' amount of tax-exempt securities, The company obtained
these securities either on its own account as a dealer for resale or in
response to customer orders. Reflecting its stated policy to hold taxexempts for trading purposes only, as opposed to investment
purposes, the company maintained a market only in those securities
which it underwrote or in which it dealt. Each day, in response to
the flow of cash receipts and disbursements, Bache & Co. would
either borrow money or repay a portion of its debt, thus
maintaining a desired cash position. In no instance were the taxexempt securities used as collateral for the loans. Taxpayer sought
to deduct his share of the interest on these loans. That portion of
this deduction allocable to the purchase or carrying of tax-exempts
was disallowed by the Commissioner.' Disagreeing, the Tax Court
held that the deduction should be allowed since it could not be
inferred that the loans were "incurred or continued [in order ] to
1413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969).
2The Commissioner disallowed $25,913. This was found by multiplying Bache's total

interest expense by a fraction whose numerator was the approximate average monthly assets
in tax-exempt securities and whose denominator was the approximate average monthly total
assets, 413 F.2d at 640 n.5.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 265(2).

Tax-exempts constituted about 1%of total assets while tax-exempt interest income
($58,933.24) accounted for less than 1/4 of 1% of Bache's gross income. John E. Leslie, 50
T.C. 11 (1968).
See note 2 supra.
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purchase or carry" the tax-exempt securities.' The court of appeals
reversed, finding a direct relationship between the "continuance of
' 7
the debt and the carrying of tax-exempt securities.
Section 265 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 states that a

deduction is not allowable for "[i]nterest on indebtedness incurred
or continued to purchase or carry obligations . . . the interest on
which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle."'
It seeks to prevent the double benefit which would accrue to a
taxpayer were he permitted to purchase or carry tax-exempt

securities with borrowed money and then deduct his interest expense
from ordinary income.'

Were this permitted, a taxpayer with

$10,000 of ordinary taxable income might borrow at a cost of
$10,000, invest in tax-exempts, and pay no income tax. The first
predecessor of 265(2) was contained in the Revenue Act of 1917'0
which prohibited the deduction of interest on loans "incurred to
purchase" tax-exempt securities. In 1918, the wording was changed

to "incurred or continued to purchase or carry.""

Congress

recognized the ambiguities inherent in the "purpose" test
established by the word "to" but, in 1918,12 1924,' and 1926,"
rejected attempts to establish a more mechanical test.15 In 1934 an
unsuccessful attempt was made to provide an alternative to the
necessary inquiry into "purpose" by adding to the language "or
the proceeds of which ard used to purchase or carry."' 6 Thus,

legislative intent and the common meaning of the language
I John

E. Leslie, 50 T.C. 11 (1968).
7413 F.2d at 641.
8 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 265(2).
'See, e.g., Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016, 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
See also 65 CONG. REC. 2428-29, 7533-49, 7594-601, 7604-09, 7668-73, 8215-16, 8254-64
(1924).
" Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330, 334.
" Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1066.
2See S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-7 (1918); H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 767,.65th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1918).
13See S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 844, 68th
Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1924).
"See S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 34 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1925).
IsThe proposal basically was to allow the deduction of all interest expense paid in excess
of the amount of tax-free interest received. See notes 12-14 supra.
"1See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1934).
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continue to mandate judicial inquiry into "purpose" before a
deduction may be disallowed. The longevity of the "purpose" test
indicates that mere concurrent holding of tax-exempt securities and
indebtedness was not necessarily intended by Congress as being
dispositive of the question of deductibility.
Finding the "purpose" for which the indebtedness is "incurred
or continued,' 7 however, has been as difficult as anticipated by
Congress. In two early cases' 8 contractors were permitted to deduct
interest on loans the security for which was unmarketable state
warrants. The warrants had been received from the state in
exchange for merchandise and subsequently, to enable the
contractors to remain in business, had been pledged as security for
the loans. These cases were long cited for the proposition that the
existence of a concurrent business purpose would permit the interest
deduction.9 More recently, however, the proscribed purpose has
been inferred from evidence of a "direct relationship" between the
indebtedness and the purchase or carrying of tax-exempts, even
where there may be other concurrent business purposes. In Illinois
Terminal Railroad v. United States20 deduction was disallowed
where the railroad used tax-exempt municipal bonds as security to
gain a higher rating in issuing its own bonds. The railroad received
marketable municipal bonds in partial payment for the sale of its
largest asset, a bridge, to the city. Some of the bonds were sold,
but the remainder was pledged as security for its own bond issue.
The proceeds from this bond issue were used to liquidate a preexisting debt. The court recognized the "business purpose" in
gaining the higher credit rating, but, because the company could
have liquidated a substantial portion of the debt by selling the taxexempts and because the tax-exempts were used as security for the
bond issue, the court found the proscribed purpose dominant.21 This
dominant purpose test was applied again in Wisconsin Cheeseman,
Inc. v. United States.2 2 Because of highly seasonal sales, the
'7 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 265(2).
"Sioux Falls Metal Culvert Co., 26 B.T.A. 1324 (1932); R.B. George Machinery Co., 26
B.T.A. 594 (1932). See also Rev. Rul. 55-389, 1955-1 CuI. BULL. 276.
1,See generally Kanter, Interest Deduction: Use, Ruse, Refuse. 46 TAXES 794, 831 n,102

(1968).
375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. CI. 1967).
21Id. at 1023.
2 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
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taxpayer's cash needs were great for a short time each year, and it
would borrow money, using tax-exempt securities as collateral. The
interest deduction was disallowed on the ground that a "direct
relationship" was established because the securities were pledged as
collateral. Furthermore, the court held that the recurring nature of
the debt in conjunction with the continued holding of tax-exempts
would be sufficient evidence of the proscribed purpose even without
the pledging. In the same decision, however, the court allowed the
company a deduction for interest on a real estate mortgage on its
newly constructed building. If the company had reduced the
mortgage by selling its tax-exempts, it would have sacrificed
liquidity. Therefore, the court concluded that the "business
purpose" of the mortgage was dominant.24
The brokerage house which buys and sells tax-exempts is placed
in a unique position by a "purpose" test. Since its business will
frequently include the purchase and carrying of tax-exempts with
borrowed funds, the "business purpose" and the proscribed
purpose will coincide. Brokers are not specifically excluded from
the operation of section 265(2) as are certain "financial
institutions, 2' 5 nor have they been excluded because their purpose
was to buy and sell tax-exempts and not to collect tax-exempt
interest." Recently in Wynn v. United States27 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision
which denied a brokerage house the interest deduction on a loan account used in the buying and selling of tax-exempt securities. In Wynn
a separate loan account was maintained to buy and resell tax-exempt
securities. The securities were pledged as collateral for the loan.
The court found as a matter of fact that there was no intent to
hold the tax-exempts for the interest income. It held, however, that
the purpose proscribed by section 265(2) was the acquisition and
holding of securities the interest on which was tax-exempt and that
the statute was not limited to situations involving an intent to
collect tax-exempt interest. Wynn could be factually distinguished
Id. at 422-23.

Id. at 423.

21

25See

'

Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931); Rev. Rul. 61-222, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 58.

See Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931); Clyde C. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner,

120 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1941); R.O. Holton & Co., 44 B.T.A. 202 (1941); Prudden & Co., 2
B.T.A. 14 (1925).
1288 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968), affd per curian, 411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969).
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from Leslie, however, because the Wynn case more clearly involved
a "direct relationship." Not only were the securities pledged as
collateral but all of the borrowed funds were specifically applied to
the purchase of tax-exempts.
In Leslie the Second Circuit overruled the Tax Court which had
not found the proscribed purpose. The Tax Court had reasoned
that no conscious consideration was given to the liquidation of taxexempts to reduce the loan, that the tax-exempts were held for a
minimum length of time with no thought of investment, and that
no "direct relationship" could be established because of the
relatively small expenditure on tax-exempts from a large,
commingled, general purpose checking account2 The purpose of
the loan, it held, was to conduct a "large and many-sided
business. '2 In reversing, the court of appeals held that it could
allocate a part of the large loan to a minor portion of the business
because it had found a "direct relationship ' 30 between the
continued indebtedness and the purchase and holding of tax-exempt
securities. It reasoned that Bache & Co. consciously considered its
tax-exempt requirements in computing its daily borrowing needs.
Furthermore, employing a "but for" test, the court found that had
Bache not purchased tax-exempts it "presumably would" 3' have
borrowed less. Since the purpose of the loan was to facilitate the
conduct of its business, since part of that business was the purchase
and carrying of tax-exempt securities, and since part of the loan
could be directly linked to the purchase and carrying of taxexempts, the court found that the purpose for part of the loan was
the purchase and carrying of tax-exempts.
One aspect of Leslie appears to represent a small but consistent
extension of the existing law pertaining to section 265(2)32 After
the Illinois Terminal Railroad case and the lower court decision in
Wisconsin Cheeseman,33 there was concern that the proscribed
purpose was inferred in so indirect a manner as to jeopardize the
interest deduction of any taxpayer who concurrently held taxexempt securities 4 Any extension of the "but for" analysis used
-50 T.C. 11 (1968).
2

Id.

3413 F.2d at 639.
31413 F.2d at 641.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 265(2).
31265 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
"See Kanter, supra note 19, at 830-39; McCollom, Recent Cases Threaten All Interest
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by the court of appeals in the Leslie case might result in the
realization of that fear. "But for" Bache's holding of tax-exempts,
for example, the brokerage house could take a smaller real estate
mortgage if it were to build. The court in Leslie, however, may not
have applied such a broad "but for" test. They found not only that
Bache had consciously considered purchasing tax-exempts with the
borrowed money, but also, that had Bache not purchased and held
tax-exempts, it "presumably would" 31 have borrowed less,
not could have borrowed less. This latter distinction may indicate
that the same analysis would not be used where there is a business
reason for borrowing a particular amount regardless of concurrent
tax-exempt holdings3 Because any extension of the "but for" test
could easily lead to a "mere concurrency" test, the decision in
Leslie is most soundly based on the "conscious consideration" of
tax-exempt holdings and purchases in fixing the size of the
recurring loan. In this light the allocation of part of the large loan
to a minor portion of the business is entirely proper. If Wynn is
correct in holding that interest on a loan account used exclusively
to buy and sell tax-exempt securities is non-deductible, there should
be no exception made for a company which merely combines
accounts to purchase both taxable and tax-exempt securities from
the same account 7 Neither is the small amount of tax-exempts
purchased from the account persuasive in negating the proscribed
purpose. A taxpayer should not be able to conceal the proscribed
purpose in a larger transaction. In this respect Leslie represents a
departure from the notion that liquidation of tax-exempts must
substantially eliminate any need for borrrowing, if the "purpose"
test is to be met.
Even if it can be assumed that the interest accrued on all
tax-exempt securities held for however short a time by Bache is
Deductions for Holders of Tax-Exempts, 27 J. TAXATION 194 (1967). Not only would such a
concurrency test seem 'contrary to the intent of Congress because of its adherence to the

purpose test, but it would also interfere in some instances with the orderly and rational

conduct of business affairs. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-389, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 276.
1 413 F.2d at 639 (emphasiS'added).
31A large home or building mortgage, for example, might be very desirable during a
period of rising interest rates or in an effort to preserve liquidity.
"' It is interesting to note, for example, that Bache & Co. earned $58,933.24 in tax-exempt
income compared with allocated carrying costs of $25,913. In Wynn the brokerage house earned
$7,608.70 compared with $23,044.03 in actual carrying costs. Leslie v. Commissioner,
413 F.2d 636, 638, 640 n.5 (2d Cir. 1969); Wynn v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D.
Pa. 1968), affd per curiam. 411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969).

1106

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1969: 1100

eventually paid to Bache by the purchaser and is non-taxable to
Bache, the result seems at odds with the legitimate purpose of the
statute. To disallow the dleduction places a burden on the conduct
of the broker's business in that the costs of financing what amounts to
its stock-in-trade is non-deductible. The legitimate reach of the statute
should be confined to insuring that the government does not finance
investment38 in tax-exempt securities. Perhaps section 265(2) can be
interpreted to so confine its effect. The difficulty lies in describing
exactly what purpose is proscribed. Wynn holds that a brokerage
house need not intend to receive tax-exempt interest to fall within
265(2). 31 This is not an unreasonable construction if subsection (2)4
is read by itself. It could be further argued that the specific exemption
allotted to certain "financial institutions"'" excludes the possibility
that Congress intended to grant special consideration to any other
businesses. However, the title of section 265 reads: "Expenses and Interest Relating to Tax-Exempt Income."4 A construction which
would allow any taxpayer to affirmatively show that his purposes did
not include receipt of tax-exempt income would not involve a special
concession to any particular business. Further, this construction
would end the coincidence of a stock broker's business purpose with
what has been found to be the proscribed purpose. The non-deductibility provisions of section 265(2) should be applicable only to that
portion of taxpayer's interest expense which is allocable to the
income resulting from investment in tax-exempt securities.
Is "Investment" is used here as understood by the Second Circuit in Leslie to mean a desire to
hold for the purpose of earning tax-exempt income. 413 F.2d at 637, 640.
" See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
10INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 265(2).
41 See note 25 supra.
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 265 (emphasis added).

